Imagine the chilling reality: Australia's top spy agency, ASIO, is grappling with a 'grim truth' as it dissects the intelligence blind spots that allowed a father and son to unleash the deadliest terrorist attack in the nation's history at Bondi Beach. This isn't just a story of oversight; it's a wake-up call about the overwhelming scale of threats facing our shores. But here's where it gets controversial—could the sheer volume of potential dangers mean some slip through the cracks, no matter how vigilant we are? Let's dive in and unpack this complex web, step by step, to understand how such a tragedy could unfold right under the radar.
The enormous scope of security risks in Australia might explain why 24-year-old Naveed Akram and his father, Sajid, who allegedly claimed 15 lives last weekend, weren't under constant, active monitoring by intelligence services. Back in 2019, ASIO evaluated Naveed, but details on their activities from then until the horrific Bondi event are scarce. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has openly admitted that ASIO and other agencies clearly overlooked something significant during that six-year gap, indicating 'real issues' in the system.
Now, leaders from federal and state governments are set to review whether intelligence on criminal activities can influence decisions for gun license applications—something currently based solely on a person's prior criminal record. Albanese has emphasized the urgent need to examine Australia's intelligence framework more closely. 'We must revisit the 2019 assessment of this individual, explore how federal and state agencies collaborate, and adjust the interactions between intelligence, security, and police forces as needed,' he stated. Importantly, funding for ASIO and the Australian Federal Police has reached unprecedented highs, yet experts warn that this doesn't solve everything.
Take Chris Taylor from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, for instance—he describes the 'grim reality' of intelligence work: there are always far more suspects than resources, human or technological, can handle. 'People often fail to grasp the vast number of individuals under ASIO's watch,' Taylor explains. 'Consider the thousands of Australians who joined ISIS in the last decade—that's just the visible part of a much larger iceberg.' As a former senior national security official, he points out a common myth: that potential terrorists are on a permanent 'watchlist' with round-the-clock surveillance. In truth, assessments like Naveed's are snapshots in time, not ongoing tracking.
'Individuals get evaluated based on available information at that moment, prioritized, and then life moves on—people change,' Taylor says. 'To catch shifts, you need new triggers or 'intersection points' that bring them back into focus.' And this is the part most people miss: a series of upcoming internal and external reviews will probe if such triggers existed between 2019 and the attack, and what might have been done to spot them.
Former Home Affairs secretary Mike Pezzullo, who headed the department until 2023, advocates for a full Commission of Inquiry. This would investigate if counter-terrorism funding and structures were adequate, especially amid rising antisemitism post-October 7, 2023, and the recent terror alert upgrade. It would also explore missed chances to thwart the Bondi tragedy. Pezzullo suggests conducting most of the inquiry behind closed doors initially, to avoid hindering police work, with public sessions later when safe.
But before jumping to conclusions, he cautions against judging intelligence failures on 'one fact in isolation.' Context matters—think about other suspects ASIO was monitoring, the documents they relied on, and even the collapse of ISIS's caliphate that year. Ex-ASIO director-general Dennis Richardson echoes this: 'It's premature to declare failure. There might have been errors, or a mix of them, or perhaps ASIO's decisions were spot-on. We just don't know yet—we need more information.'
Zooming in on the Akram duo, Naveed underwent a six-month ASIO review from October 2019 to April 2020, due to his links with a Sydney ISIS cell. Reports indicate his involvement with the Dawah Street Movement, tied to radical preacher Wisam Haddad, and connections to ISIS figures like Isaac El Matari and Youssef Uweinat—both arrested shortly after Naveed caught ASIO's eye. Yet, ASIO concluded at the time there was no current violent threat from him. He also frequented the Al Madina Dawah Centre in Bankstown, where Haddad preached (check out this video of the gunman speaking to teens: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-12-16/video-shows-bondi-beach-shooting-gunman-preaching-islam-to-teens/106145626). Haddad's lawyer firmly denies any role in the attack.
Since 2019, details on further agency knowledge of Naveed or his father remain murky. Taylor notes that investigators will start by examining their relationships, frequented centers, affiliations, and communications to fill the 'black hole' from 2019 to 2025. 'We have starkly different data points now,' he says, 'but we're lacking insight into their intentions or behaviors. We've seen their access to firearms, but not much on associations or contacts in those years.'
Counter-terrorism expert Greg Barton questions how ASIO missed Naveed's radicalization path. 'Did he abandon ISIS extremism only to return later, perhaps influenced by someone else? Or did he persist while his father got drawn in, and we didn't check back? It seems that's what happened, with no apparent follow-ups in six years—a potential major oversight if true.' Home Affairs Minister Tony Burke acknowledges a 'dramatic shift' in Naveed's risk level, but whether it was detectable remains unanswered.
Taylor suggests data science could unearth new leads, raising questions about agencies' data tools and if events like Sajid's gun license application should have been flagged to intelligence. 'Could systems like the NSW firearms registry be linked to generate alerts for reassessments?' he wonders. Plus, their trip to Davao in the Philippines—a known terror hub—where they allegedly trained militarily, demands scrutiny. Were Australian authorities informed of this travel to Filipino borders? Barton agrees: 'If monitored, that trip should have set off alarms, but it appears it didn't, maybe because they dropped off the priority list.' Taylor notes that while millions visit the Philippines annually, a jaunt to Mindanao stands out sharply from a standard trip to Manila. The shooters' profile differs from past cases, prompting debate on whether methods need updating.
Richardson adds that if ASIO's 2019 judgment was accurate, Naveed wouldn't be on a 'movement alert' list today. Partnerships with foreign intelligence will also factor in.
Beyond monitoring, Taylor highlights ASIO's need to adapt to the father-son dynamic, which contrasts with past conspiracies (think linked communications) or lone wolves (with digital trails). 'Can systems built for groups or individuals handle this family-based terror?' he asks. The Lowy Institute points out that family threats radicalize fast, stay secret, dodge detection, and complicate bystander alerts. This pattern is increasingly common—recall the brothers in the 2013 Boston Marathon attack, the 2015 Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris, or the husband-wife duo in the 2015 San Bernardino incident in California.
But here's where it gets controversial: Is it fair to blame ASIO for not surveilling everyone indefinitely, especially with limited resources? Or should we demand more proactive follow-ups, even if it means sacrificing some privacy? And what about the role of international travel alerts—should all flagged individuals be barred from certain spots? Most people might agree that family-based plots are harder to spot, but does that excuse the gaps? Share your thoughts: Do you think ASIO needs a complete overhaul, or is this an inevitable flaw in a free society? Could better data sharing have stopped this? Weigh in below—let's discuss!
